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This thesis replicates recent diagnostic utility studies to determine whether the original 
methods are (1) generalizable to a new population and (2) useful in identifying specific 
questioning strategies relevant to international militaries. Previous research shows that 
people are, on average, only slightly better-than-chance at detecting deception. In 2006, 
Personality and Social Psychology Review published “Accuracy of Deception 
Judgments” in which Charles F. Bond Jr. and Bella DePaulo identified that meta-analysis 
yields an across-study average accuracy rate of about 54%. New research has shifted 
from the historical cue-based deception detection paradigm in favor of the idea of 
diagnostic utility. Specifically, this new line of research provides a basis for 
demonstrating that the design of specific questions is vital in determining deceptive 
individuals. Currently, the research conducted thus far provides levels of deception 
detection accuracy significantly greater than the usual slightly-better-than-chance results 
that is characterized by historical research. Our findings from quantitative Study 1 
demonstrated that international military officer participants detected deception at 70.8% 
for experts and 63.8% for non-experts. Finally, the authors’ qualitative Study 2 identified 
that participant’s claim to have utilized third-party information, physical information, and 
verbal/nonverbal clues most often when detecting deception in previous situations. These 
findings are in line with historical research.   
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The body of work concerning interpersonal deception detection has, for decades, 
focused on the verbal and nonverbal cues of those being questioned. Regardless of the 
setting or sample, the methods of questioning subjects have not ventured beyond what the 
subject emits as cues. Over the course of the last decade, however, a new school of 
thought has emerged. Although there is an abundance of collected works on deception 
detection, this is the first thesis of its kind at the Naval Postgraduate School to study in 
detail the use of content- and context-based questioning within a military population. The 
issues discussed in this thesis have wide-ranging applicability both in the military and 
accounting/acquisition fraud environments. In evaluating how accurately military officers 
detect deception and what information is relied upon to make veracity judgments, the 
authors’ overall research will be replicating previous studies conducted by Levine, Blair, 
and Clare (2014) and Park, Levine, McCornack, Morrison, and Ferrara (2002) on a 
previously unexamined population: international military officers. The successful 
completion of this thesis will not only add to the body of knowledge on the topic of 
deception detection but has the possibility for further replication in classified subsets such 
as defector interrogation and counterintelligence. 
A. BACKGROUND/PROBLEM 
The predominance of nonverbal cue-related research in the field of deception 
detection has led to stagnation in terms of accuracy improvement. Using the Levine et al. 
(2014) methodology of diagnostic utility, this thesis will show replicability and applicability 
within a military context. Furthermore, through applying the principles of Park et al.’s (2002) 
research, this thesis will examine how the population determines deception. 
1. Deception Detection Accuracy 
Until recently, research into deception detection has focused primarily upon 
interviewees’ nonverbal cues. Decades of research on these nonverbal cues show we are 
barely better than chance, garnering nothing more than a meta-analysis accuracy rate of 
53.46% (Bond, 2006). Moreover, Bond, Levine, Park and other researchers have noted 
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that most people believe in the fallibility of physical human nature, the crossing of legs, 
the twitching of an eye, the drumming of fingers, and that such subtle nonverbal cues 
provide the critical clues to identifying when deception is occurring. Indeed, modern pop 
culture, including popular television programs, shows behavior that demonstrates leakage 
or “tells” during high-stakes poker matches or a criminal suspect’s subtle behaviors 
during interrogation by law enforcement officers. DePaulo’s most recent meta-analysis 
looking at 208 deception detection accuracy studies tells us the opposite: When relying 
on nonverbal cues, people are not much better than chance (50%) in any given situation 
when attempting to determine if somebody is lying. In the literature, an accuracy ceiling 
of 65% exists (Levine et al., 2014). 
The focal point of Study 1 is replicating research conducted by Levine et al. 
(2014), which indicates that more useful strategies can lead to better deception detection 
accuracy. Specifically, Levine et al. argue that what has been lacking for decades is 
attention paid to the specific question strategies used in interview situations. One 
important concept related to question strategies is diagnostic utility. Diagnostic utility is a 
scalable level upon which an individual uses information to form a correct conclusion. 
This scale ranges both positive and negative in that negative information would be 
viewed as deceptive. As noted by Levine et al. (2014) in their sixth experiment, which is 
being replicated in this research study (and which involves diagnostic utility), Levine and 
his colleagues were able to raise accuracy levels in excess of 70%. 
2. How People Really Detect Lies 
The prevailing deception detection literature and experimentation have been 
based on the immediacy of nonverbal cues exhibited by an individual and interpreted by a 
recipient. Though this concept retains validity, it is inherently flawed as it fails to address 
the additional information a recipient possesses when he/she makes a determination of 
authenticity. As examined by Park, Levine, McCornack, Morrison, and Ferrara (2002), 
most individuals in lie-determination settings rely upon information gathered prior to the 
detection of the lie. This elongated timeline includes “information sources such as 
information from third parties, the consistency of statements with prior knowledge, the 
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consistency of messages with physical evidence, and confessions,” which when taken 
into account with nonverbal cues build an individual’s truth/lie judgment (Park et al., 
2002, p. 144). It is this combined effect of nonverbal and subjective historical evidence 
that forms the basis of Study 2. 
3. The Current Studies 
Study 1 replicates the sixth study in Levine et al.’s (2014) program of research 
using U.S. military officers to determine whether or not a replication with a different 
population would yield similar results and, thus, determine the generalizability of their 
findings. Study 2 replicates the Park et al. (2002) research into the applicability of 
historical subjective information used in the detection of lies and if such information 
varies when applied to a different population. The results of both studies will help to 
better shape the fields of accession, recruiting, training and development, interrogation, 
associated fields of defector questioning, flag officer promotion board questioning, and 
fraud detection in international military contexts. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to conduct the experimental replication and 
documentation of further improvement in deception detection accuracy over that of 
previous findings along with the parallel study of domestic military officers. The nature 
of this topic dictates the use of both qualitative and quantitative opportunities to further 
expand known knowledge of deception detection. Quantitatively, the focus will be on 
strategic questioning methods and resulting deception detection accuracy. Qualitatively, 
this research looks at when, how, and with what information deception is actually 
detected in the workplace. 
1. Study 1: Content and Contextual Questioning Effects on Accuracy 
Unlike the bulk of previously conducted research, Study 1 aims to remove the 
focus on nonverbal cues. Question effects detail how the questioning of an individual 
may potentially impact the outcome of deception detection. It is specifically the 
manipulation of such question effects through the use of applied content and contextual 
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questioning that the authors believe can and will lead to an increase in diagnostic utility. 
Diagnostic utility is the overarching conceptual idea that information has varying 
amounts of utility, both positive and negative. It is the application of diagnostically useful 
statements that the authors measure as a means of deception detection. 
2. Study 2: How People Really Detect Lies 
The purpose of Study 2 is to examine what additional information the selected 
population relies upon in truth/lie determinations and the associated time horizon with 
regards to deception realization. This study differs from traditional works in that, rather 
than focus on the questions or questioning method, it instead places emphasis on the 
individual detector’s backgrounds and historical subjectivity. 
C. OBJECTIVES 
As our primary objective, this research study will provide a thorough and current 
review of the issues regarding deception detection and its applicable utility within the 
international military communities, Department of Defense, and other governmental 
agencies. Study 1 will seek to determine the role of specific question strategies and 
expertise (previous interview or interrogation training/experience) on deception detection 
accuracy by replicating Levine et al.’s (2014) research on diagnostic utility. Study 2 will 
seek to determine what subjective historical methods individuals use in deception 
detection by replicating Park et al.’s (2002) work on what information people use other 
than the verbal and nonverbal behaviors of the liar when determining deception. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis and associated studies are, in essence and design, a replication of 
Levine et al.’s (2014) and Park et al.’s (2002) studies to determine if both researchers’ 
results are generalizable beyond college students and law enforcement and useful in 
identifying specific questioning strategies relevant to international military activities and 
coalition operations to include the fields of accession, recruiting, training and 
development, interrogation, associated fields of defector questioning, flag officer 
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accession questioning, and fraud detection in international military contexts. Specifically, 
this thesis aims to answer the following two research questions: 
 Utilizing the diagnostic utility methods of content and contextual 
questioning presented in the Levine et al. (2014) study, are international 
military officers able to distinguish deception with greater accuracy than 
the previous meta-analysis mean of 54%? 
 Utilizing the Park et al. (2002) method, what types of information do 
international military officers report using when detecting lies in the 
workplace? 
E. SCOPE 
This research project is to cover the examination of the abilities of international 
military officers (N = 41) to detect deception when presented with high-stakes interviews 
where some interviewees lied and others told the truth. Specifically, Study 1 examines 
the role of specific questioning strategies and the self-reported expertise of the 
participants (expert versus inexpert) in accuracy levels. Study 2 examines what, if any, 
additional subjective information participation is used in determining deception and, also, 
over what timeline veracity judgments occurs. This thesis merely looks to replicate both 
the Levine et al. (2014) and Park et al. (2002) studies and determine whether or not they 
are generalizable to a different population, namely international military officers. Also, 
the results of these studies might shed light on appropriate high-stakes deception settings 
such as defector questioning and detection of fraud in international military procurement 
and acquisition settings. 
F. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
(1) Assumptions 
As explained in both the Levine (2014) and Bond (2006) works, the primary 
assumptions of this research include that recent findings are not flukes and are instead 
related to changes in the research and empirical findings of older limited works. 
Additionally, this research study assumes international military officers are a distinct and 
different population from what has previously been studied. This uniqueness is a result of 
training received by military personnel, the inherent cultural emphasis on truthfulness, 
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and risks associated with high-stakes deception. Lastly, another assumption is that Study 
2 will replicate the work of Park et al. (2002), given that Lindsey, Dunbar, and Russell. 
(2012) is the only other existing replication of such results using a workforce sample. 
(2) Limitations 
Previous deception studies assume participants will display a truth bias in that 
human beings have shown over time a belief in the innate honesty of others (Park et al., 
2002). This explains the feelings of betrayal often exhibited by those who have 
experienced lies. For the purpose of this research, the authors assume the participants will 
operate with a truth bias. Truth bias, however, is not manipulated or measured to 
determine if that is a replicable finding in the specific population studied. This thesis will 
not address any psychological factors such as mood, temperament, or any other 
conditions that might affect respondents’ participation. No financial constraints limited 
the authors, as data collection included only volunteer participation.  
G. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into two separate but mutually reinforcing studies. 
Chapters II–V comprise Study 1. Study 1 is the replication of Levine et al.’s 
(2014) study of diagnostic utility—or questioning effects—on the role of expertise on 
detection deception accuracy. Chapter II, specifically, is the literature review that 
introduces the history of deception detection research and related literature. Chapter III 
provides the Study 1 methodology, including information on participants, materials, and 
the procedure. Chapter IV presents the statistical results of Study 1, and Chapter V 
expands on those results through detailed discussion of the findings and their limitations. 
Chapters VI–IX comprise Study 2. Study 2 is the replication of Park et al.’s 
(2002) study of how people really detect lies in their everyday lives. Chapter VI is the 
literature review that introduces the premise of Park et al.’s (2002) research on how 
people actually detect lies in their interactions. Chapter VII provides the Study 2 
methodology, including information on participants and the procedure. Chapter VIII 
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presents the results of Study 2, and Chapter IX expands on those results through detailed 
discussion of the findings and their limitations. 
Lastly, in Chapter X, the overall summary, conclusions, and recommendations for 
further deception detection research will be presented. 
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II. STUDY 1: BACKGROUND HISTORY / LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
Few things are as fundamentally human as the quest to accurately ascertain the 
veracity of one’s intentions. The earliest codified documents are rife with tales of and 
punishments for lying, be it Indian Sanskrit Vedas or the Greek physician Erasistratus, 
humanity’s ordeal with the nature of truth remains a constant (Trovillo, 1939). 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DECEPTION DETECTION 
The historical underpinnings of deception detection begin with the initial reliance 
on what Trovillo (1939) notes as superstition and the concept of the Ordeal. 
It is significant that, with few exceptions, the historical accounts of 
deception-detecting from the days of Christ, through the Middle Ages, are 
the history of the Ordeal. Superstition so swayed the minds of people that 
it was the rule for them to ask for the Ordeal to prove their innocence. The 
accuser was not looking, evidently, for suspicious clues in the face or 
actions of the individual, for apparently the psychology of deceit did not 
exist. Even the religions of Europe, as late as the 16th Century, taught that 
proof of innocence or guilt would be furnished from on High in a variety 
of mystical modes. People did not consider that proof lay within or on the 
surface of the suspect himself (Trovillo, 1939, p. 850). 
The Ordeal method of deception detection is easily understood when examined in 
the context of the early witch trials and the Inquisition of the 14th and 15th centuries 
where individuals were forced to participate in torturous tests where the outcome of the 
event was the prime determinate of the presence of deception. 
As religious fervor subsided and use of the scientific method began to flourish, so 
too did the study of emotional states and their bearing on deception detection (Trovillo, 
1939). One of the earliest such works was conducted by Mosso, an Italian physiologist. 
Mosso’s work focused on the effect of fear with regard to deception, specifically the fear 
one experiences in being detected. Mosso’s measurement of blood flow as it circulates 
and pools in the body led to the first crude attempts to measure the physiological effects 
of deception (Trovillo, 1939). 
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What these two examples illustrate is the ever shifting framework through which 
deception detection has been viewed. Recent, cutting-edge research indicates that 
diagnostic utility—or the degree to which information is useful as prompted through 
strategic questioning—is key to understanding how humans detect deception. Prior 
theories, however, hinge upon the psychological and physiological states of the person 
lying and the resulting nonverbal cues that could be “read” to detect deception. The 
recent work on diagnostic utility questions the usefulness of these nonverbal cues that 
might or might not yield diagnostically useful information about whether somebody is 
lying. Such reliance on nonverbal cues has yielded detection accuracy rates that are not 
much different than chance (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). As such, the concept of diagnostic 
utility presented in this thesis is based on Levine et al.’s (2014) work and differs from the 
classical interpretation of diagnostic utility in that it includes the use of Park et al.’s 
(2002) additional reliance on subjective historical information. Specifically, Levine et al. 
(2014) indicate that diagnostic utility, in relation to deception detection, is the 
consideration of contextual message content including plausibility, correspondence with 
known facts, the correlation of the two, and these are what influence one’s true ability to 
detect deception. 
B. REVIEW OF PREVIOUS DECEPTION DETECTION ACCURACY 
STUDIES 
Upon review of the last four decades of deception detection research, a common 
theme emerges across all studies: A set of individuals is recruited as message initiators 
(liars or truth tellers), a separate group acts as the sample and is tasked to determine the 
veracity of the initiator’s message with accuracy being calculated as the proportion of 
correct judgments made by the sample and based on nonverbal low-risk deception 
settings (Park et al., 2002). Furthermore, the meta-data accuracy rate presented by these 
studies consistently falls around 57% (Kraut, 1980) and always between 45% and 70% 
(e.g.,  Kalbfleisch, 1994; Miller & Stiff, 1993; Vrij, 2000). Over the past 40 years, 
including 208 studies as noted by Bond and DePaulo (2006), this belief has been near 
collectively held in the literature (e.g., Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, & Rockwell, 1994; 
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DePaulo, Kirkendol, Tang, & O’Brien, 1988; Feeley, deTurck, & Young, 1995; 
Kalbfleisch, 1994; Millar & Millar, 1995; Stiff & Miller, 1986; Vrij, 1994). 
What deviated from this trend was the work by Levine et al. (2014) that focused 
on the previously described intrinsic value of diagnostic utility. Two complementary 
approaches to deception detection involving diagnostically useful information comprise 
the current pertinent body of knowledge concerning the subject. The Strategic Use of 
Evidence (SUE) method hinges on an interviewer possessing a form of useful evidence 
pertinent to the line of questioning without the interviewee knowing, in hopes the subject 
will inadvertently make false statements as compared to the evidence (Clemens, Granhag, 
& Strömwall, 2013). Further analysis regarding the way in which the evidence is 
presented during the interview leads to what has been described earlier as the Content in 
Context (CiC) technique. Both methods set an arbitrary baseline with presumably useful 
obtained, or obtainable, knowledge that allows the interviewer to measure the variable 
feedback (Levine et al., 2014). Providing useful knowledge and background specifics are 
critical to both methods and at the heart of this current study. 
C. STUDY DESIGN 
This study was a 3x2 mixed design with the three sets of questions presented in 
Table 4 as a repeated factor, the two levels of expertise (expert versus inexpert) as an 
independent groups variable, and detection accuracy as the dependent variable. Expertise 
was operationally defined using participants’ answers to the following question: Have 
you ever conducted interviewing or interrogation as a regular part of your job? 
Participants who answered “No” were coded as inexpert; those who answered “Yes” 
were coded as experts. An additional question asked was, “Have you ever received 
formal interviewing or interrogation training?” Only 20% of participants had received 
such training; therefore, the sample size was too small to make meaningful comparisons 
in the current study using this question as a proxy for expertise. Participant answers (their 
truth/lie judgments) were scored for accuracy by adding the number of correct judgments 
and dividing by the total number of judgments. 
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Each participant watched and rated 12 videotaped interviews of different students 
denying cheating. The 12 interviews used in the current study were the same interviews 
that were used in Levine et al.’s sixth study. For each of the question sets, two lying 
cheaters’ interview segments were shown. For each deceptive interview, a corresponding 
honest interview was selected by matching on sex, race, and approximate physical 
appearance. Thus, there were two honest non-cheaters and two lying cheaters, all of 
whom denied cheating, interviewed with each of the three question sets. 
D. RATIONALE FOR STUDYING DECEPTION DETECTION ACCURACY 
OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARIES 
Initial thoughts on deception detection in the military are guided toward 
intelligence and counter-intelligence specialty fields. As previously noted, however, the 
humanistic quality of deception means detection practices are relevant in all settings of 
interpersonal interaction. As a government entity, the military must always maintain 
ethical practices and morally sound principles, which in turn facilitate a strong truth bias. 
It is very difficult for individuals interacting within the military system, where it is 
reasonably assumed that all participants are honest brokers, for those same military 
members to then exit the system and work with individuals whose motivations are self-
serving and not bound by the same politico-social contract. Additionally, differences 
exist in national and social cultures throughout the world. Deception is thus easily found 
in varying forms in varying specialties. Although not all specialties or circumstances 
require deception detection training on the level of enemy combatant interrogation, 
deception detection is a useful tool in areas such as contracting fraud, military law 
enforcement, and varying degrees of leadership where high-stakes deception can occur 
and where a healthy skepticism and base of training may aide mission accomplishment. 
Buller and Burgoon’s (1996) research on Interpersonal Deception Theory for the 
U.S. Army Research Institute serves as the primary academic linkage between this 
work’s analysis of deception detection theory and the military. His four-year examination 
inadvertently parallels the same issues as the research questions posited in this work. 
Buller and Burgoon (1996) focus on issues related specifically to intelligence gathering 
and explores defector deception detection and the application or influence of psycho-
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cultural lenses on strategic posturing/positioning as a focus of further research. This is 
further addressed in Skidmore and Ortiz’s (2014) parallel research study on domestic 
officers. 
Broadhurst and Cheng’s (2005) research on The Effects of First and Second 
Language on Lie Detection Ability demonstrate how language barriers affect an 
observer’s ability to detect lies. They identified that observers were better able to detect 
liars speaking in a second language rather than their first language, but they found it more 
difficult to identify those telling the truth in a second language versus their first language 
(Broadhurst & Cheng, 2005). While our research only focuses on detection in 
participants’ second languages, it should be noted that participants’’ English as a second 
language aptitudes may cause differences between our results and the results of Skidmore 
and Ortiz’s (2014) simultaneous deception detection accuracy research. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Study 1 research is based upon the qualitative replication of the Levine, Blair, and 
Clare  (2014) methodology. Given that utilizing the diagnostic utility methods of content 
and contextual questioning presented in the Levine et al. (2014) study, are international 
military officers able to distinguish deception with greater accuracy than the previous 
meta-analysis mean of 54% and, if so, to what degree? If the study holds true to the 
findings of Levine et al. (2014), then the authors should find a mean accuracy in excess 
of 54% and improvement most likely greater than 70%, with a corresponding minimal 
effect for expert judgments. Should the replication prove false, further research will be 
required to examine which portion of the study does not hold true in the chosen sample 
and to what amount modification will need to occur. The next chapter fully details the 
methodology used in Study 1. 
 14 
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III. STUDY 1: METHODOLOGY 
In order to replicate the Levine et al. (2014) sixth experiment in an appropriately 
clinical method, the authors first sought approval of the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects (IRB). The authors 
completed the mandated IRB ethically based training and all additional reviews and 
subsequently received approval to initiate research. All research occurred on campus in 
specially designated rooms designed to best replicate the atmosphere of the initial study. 
Daily findings and survey materials were maintained under secure conditions, no 
personally identifiable information (PII) was collected and no leakage of demographics 
occurred. 
A. PARTICIPANTS 
Participants were 41 international military officers studying in resident programs 
at the Naval Postgraduate School. Tables 1, 2, and 3 summarize each participant’s 
country, rank and branch of service, respectively. Participants’ ages ranged from 25–45 
(M = 34.68, SD = 5.298) and years of military service ranged from 3–25 (M = 14.63, SD 
= 6.541). There are a total of 17 countries that the participants volunteered from to 
participate in this study. Due to a low sample size and some countries and regions being 
represented by only one participant, a comparative analysis based on language, 
behavioral, and cultural norms was not able to be conducted. Also, 85.4% were male; 
82.9% identified themselves as Caucasian/White; 9.8% were Asian/Pacific Islander; 
7.3% were Hispanic/Latino(a) (see Table 3). In terms of expertise, 26.8% indicated they 
had received formal interviewing or interrogation training, and 29.3% reported that they 
had conducted interviewing or interrogation as a regular part of their jobs. All 
participants volunteered their participation and none received any form of compensation 
for their involvement in this research. Participation was anonymous with the only 
demographic information being gender, age, race, rank, years of military service, military 




Table 1.   Participants by Country  
 





Ukraine 5 12.2 12.2
Brazil 3 7.3 19.5
Greece 1 2.4 22
Australia 7 17.1 39
Norway 1 2.4 41.5
Columbia 1 2.4 43.9
Singapore 2 4.9 48.8
Japan 1 2.4 51.2
Turkey 10 24.4 75.6
Germany 2 4.9 80.5
Bulgaria 1 2.4 82.9
Sweden 1 2.4 85.4
Chile 1 2.4 87.8
Romania 1 2.4 90.2
Netherlands 1 2.4 92.7
Indonesia 1 2.4 95.1
El Salvador 1 2.4 97.6












Table 3.   Race/Ethnicity 
B. MATERIALS 
Twelve videotaped interview segments—all used in the Levine et al. (2014) 
examination of diagnostic utility and expertise in their sixth study—were used as the 
experimental stimuli in the current study. Specifically, each segment showed a university 
student being interviewed about cheating in a research-related trivia game. All students in 
the 12 segments denied cheating, but half (6) actually cheated. Thus, the 12 video 
segments resulted in six honest students telling the truth (they denied cheating and they, 
in fact, did not cheat), and six dishonest students lying (they cheated, but they denied it in 
the interview). See Levine et al. (2014, especially pp. 270–272) for a detailed description 
of how the experimental videotapes were created. The 12 interview segments represented 








First Question Set 
1. Did you find the trivia questions difficult? 
2. Was team work much of a factor? How so, please explain. 
3. In looking at your score, you did better than other groups. Does this surprise you? 
4. How would you explain your success? 
5. Did cheating occur when I left the room? 
6. Why should I believe you? 
Second Question Set 
1. How much experience have you had working in teams? 
2. Have you played trivial pursuit games before? 
3. How often do you play? [follow-up] Why do you/ don’t you play them much? 
4. In the current game, did you find the questions difficult? [follow-up] If you were 
    going to scale it on a scale of 1 to 10, what would you say they were in terms of 
    difficulty? 
5. Was teamwork much of a factor in your performance? 
6. What would you say if I told you that you did better than other groups? 
7. How would you explain your performance? 
8. Did you cheat when the experimenter left the room? 
9. Are you telling me the truth? 
10. What would your partner say if I asked them the same question? 
Third Question Set 
1. Tell me, in as much detail as you can, what happened during the trivia game? 
2. How well did you do on in the trivia game? 
3. Which questions did you and your partner get right? 
4. For the answers you got right, explain how you knew the right answer? 
5. In detail, what happened when the experimenter left the room? 
6. Did any cheating occur? 
7. When I interview your partner, what will they say about cheating? 
8. Did you and your partner discuss cheating? 
9. If someone did cheat, what should happen to them? 
Table 4.   Questions Asked in the Three Sets of Cheating Tapes 




Participants entered a lab setting at which point they read and completed a 
consent document. After consenting to participate, each respondent individually watched 
a series of 12 videotaped interview segments lasting approximately two minutes apiece. 
After each segment, the participant paused the video for as long as necessary to make a 
truth-lie judgment regarding the individual in the video (see Appendix for full 
questionnaire for Studies 1 and 2). Participants also answered a series of demographic 
questions. 
D. DATA ANALYSIS APPROACH 
Data was analyzed using mixed-model multivariate analysis of variance where 
question strategy was the repeated factor and expertise was the between factor, with 
accuracy as the dependent variable. Effect sizes are also reported. 
The majority of our sample identified as Caucasian/White as shown in Figure 1. If 
we include unknown and international officers (Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), this is 
in line with Naval Postgraduate School ethnicity/race demographics for 2013. The small 
sample size for races other than Caucasian/White does not allow for statistically 
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IV. STUDY 1: RESULTS 
The data were analyzed with a 3x2 mixed Analysis of Variance with the three 
question sets as a repeated factor, the two levels of expertise (expert versus non-expert) 
as an independent groups variable, and detection accuracy (percent correct) as the 
dependent variable. 
Consistent with Levine et al. (2014), this study replicated the strong main effect 
for questioning strategy, F(2, 78) = 12.59, p < .001, 2 = .24, and a main effect for 
expertise, F(1, 39) = 4.71, p < .05, 2 = .01. One should note that the main effect for 
expertise found in the current study is similar in magnitude to Levine et al.’s finding (2 
= .01). Although Levine et al. found a statistically significant question type x expertise 
interaction, the current study did not (the effect size for Levine et al.’s interaction finding 
was small with 2 = .01). Specifically, the question by expertise interaction in the current 
study was not statistically significant, F(2, 78) = 0.44, p = 0.65. 
The cell means are presented in Table 5. Across experts and non-experts, 
accuracy was 33.7% (95% CI =  4.4%), 52.1% (95% CI =  5.3%), and 67.3% (95% CI 
=  3.8%) for question sets 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Accuracy means in the Question Set 
1 and Quest Set 3 cells were significantly different from both 50–50 chance and the 54% 
meta-analysis mean at p < .01. Interestingly, accuracy means for Question Set 2 were 
exactly 50–50 chance for non-experts and consistent with the meta-analytic mean of 54% 
for experts. 
 
Question Set Set One Set Two Set Three 
Expert 31.3% (18.8%) 54.2% (23.4%) 70.8% (23.4%) 
Non-expert 36.2% (28.0%) 50.0% (33.4%) 63.8% (21.7%) 
Table 5.   Mean Accuracy (and Standard Deviations) by Condition, Study 1 
The data were further analyzed using a 3x2 mixed Analysis of Variance with the 
three question sets as a repeated factor, two levels of training (whether or not participants 
had ever received formal interviewing and interrogation training) as the independent 
groups variable, and detection accuracy (percent correct) as the dependent variable. 
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Consistent with this study’s previous results, Levine et al.’s findings were 
replicated such that a strong main effect for questioning strategy, F(2, 78) = 10.77, p < 
.001, 2 = .22, and a main effect for training, F(1, 39) = 4.71, p < .05, 2 = .11, were 
found. The question by training interaction was not statistically significant, F(2, 78) = 
0.17, p = 0.85. 
The cell means are presented in Table 6. Across trained and untrained 
participants, accuracy was 32.4% (95% CI =  4.5%), 48.0% (95% CI =  5.3%), and 
64.4% (95% CI =  3.9%) for question sets 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Accuracy means in 
all but one cell were significantly different from both 50–50 chance and the 54% meta-
analysis mean at p < .01. Accuracy means for Question Set 2 with no formal training 
were consistent with the meta-analytic mean of 54% for experts. 
 
Question Set Set One Set Two Set Three 
Formal Training 27.3% (23.6%) 40.9% (20.2%) 61.4% (28.2%) 
No Formal Training 37.5% (26.1%) 55.0% (33.1%) 67.5% (19.9%) 
Table 6.   Mean Accuracy (and Standard Deviations) by Condition, Study 1 
The following chapter provides discussions, findings, limitations, and 
recommendations based on analysis. 
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V. STUDY 1: DISCUSSION, FINDINGS, LIMITATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON ANALYSIS 
The results of the study, as hypothesized, replicated the previous findings 
illustrated in Levine et al.’s (2014) research by increasing the mean accuracy by question 
set increase in utility of content and context. The importance of the findings, similar to 
that of Skidmore and Ortiz’s (2014) simultaneous research conducted on domestic 
officers, is that participants demonstrated an increase in deception detection accuracy 
regardless to expertise disclosure as previously shown in Table 4. 
A. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS 
Historical deception detection methods utilizing verbal and nonverbal cues 
demonstrated meta-data analysis mean of 54% (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). The 
researchers’ replication of content and contextual questioning methods demonstrated an 
increase in expert participant accuracy to 70.8% and non-expert participant to 63.8%. 
Even though the replication using international military officers illustrated statistical 
difference for non-experts, there was a higher mean accuracy utilizing content and 
contextual questioning compared to Levine et al. (2014) results. No statistical difference 
for experts compared to Levine et al. (2014) was identified for expert participants as 
illustrated in Table 7. 
 
Question Set Set One Set Two Set Three 
Experts 29.2% (22.9%) 64.3% (24.1%) 72.4% (22.2%) 
Student (Inexpert) 39.2% (24.1%) 66.6% (24.9%) 72.9% (22.7%) 
Table 7.   Mean Accuracy (and Standard Deviation) by Condition 
(from Levine et al., 2014) 
Comparing international officers mean accuracy to the results of the simultaneous 
research of domestic officers by Skidmore and Ortiz (2014), we identify lower mean 
accuracy among international military officers as illustrated in Table 8. 
 
 28 
Question Set Set One Set Two Set Three 
Expert 36.0% (23.2%) 66.2% (22.9%) 75.7% (22.6%) 
Inexpert 39.0% (26.8%) 69.5% (23.3%) 81.0% (22.3%) 
Table 8.   Mean Accuracy (and Standard Deviation) by Condition 
(from Skidmore & Ortiz, 2014) 
Although international military officers did not demonstrate the similar results as 
Levine et al. (2014) when it comes to levels of training, international military officers 
demonstrated a higher mean accuracy than historical mean accuracy of 54% (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006). 
Mean accuracy among O4 officers (Table 9) had the greatest increase in 
resemblance to Levine et al.’s 2014 study. The authors identified junior international 
officers and senior grade international officers had the widest dispersion of mean 
accuracy, possibly due to limited exposure to western culture and language aptitudes as 
discussed in Broadhurst and Cheng (2005). Question Set 3 mean accuracies utilizing 
content and contextual diagnostic utility questioning illustrates its applicability in 




Table 9.   Rank Accuracy by Question Set 
B. LIMITATIONS 
The sample in this research of international military officers did not take into 
account cultural/social differences that do exist based on regional/national and religious 
norms. Nor did the research take into account English language aptitude other than that 
the international military officers scored adequately to be accepted at NPS via the Test of 
English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL). Furthermore, the sample size (N=41) is fairly 
small considering the degrees of freedom (DOF). It was, however, directly representative 
of Naval Postgraduate School international officer population (2013 Factbook, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2013). Lastly, the restriction of a single contextual nature of the lies 
examined in the experiment by international military officers is not representative of the 
high-stakes situations of the international military environment. 
Rank Mean Trimmed Mean (5%) Standard Error Lower Bound (95%) Upper Bound (95%)
O2 .3125 .2917 .12275 .0222 .6028
O3 .4091 .4129 .06098 .2732 .5450
O4 .3542 .3380 .08404 .1692 .5391
O5 .3438 .3264 .06576 .1882 .4993
O6* .1250 - .12500 - -
O2 .4688 .4653 .13724 .1442 .7933
O3 .5455 .5505 .10010 .3224 .7685
O4 .4167 .4074 .07107 .2602 .5731
O5 .6563 .6597 .09375 .4346 .8779
O6* .5000 - .2500 - -
O2 .5938 .5903 .09375 .3721 .8154
O3 .6364 .6376 .06182 .4986 .7741
O4 .7708 .7731 .04825 .6646 .8770
O5 .5938 .5903 .09375 .3721 .8154
O6* .6250 - .12500 - -
Question Set 1 Accuracy
Question Set 2 Accuracy
Question Set 3 Accuracy
* Only (2) O6 Participants in this Sample
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON ANALYSIS 
This methodology should be further utilized and replicated to gain a more robust 
understanding of the effects of content- and contextual-oriented questioning when it 
comes to international officers. Because of the limitation of the Naval Postgraduate 
School sample, we recommend replication of this research in Study 1 be conducted in 
other regional settings and further refined to incorporate local cultural and language 
norms. This research demonstrates that deception detection training be 
reviewed/redesigned to include content and contextual methodology techniques. The next 
chapter will provide the background and literature review for Study 2. 
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VI. STUDY 2: BACKGROUND HISTORY / LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
The focus of Study 2 is the qualitative factor of deception detection versus the 
quantitative issue of accuracy as in Study 1. Study 2 seeks to determine what factors, in 
addition to nonverbal cues and leakage, individuals use when making a truth/lie 
judgment. As Park et al. (2002) argue that there are four false assumptions that previous 
research has relied on in believing the primacy of verbal and nonverbal behaviors of the 
messenger—”questions researchers have asked, the research designs used to study 
deception detection, the directions the literature has taken, and the theories used to 
predict and explain the results” (p. 147)—Study 2 directly addresses the issues of the first 
and second assumptions by broadening the field of questions asked in relation to the 
underpinning reasons for the truth/lie judgment and by modifying the study to attempt 
replication of the Park et al. (2002) findings. 
The only other study of workplace deception detection specifically examined the 
relational aspect of the power dynamic to that of deception detection (Lindsey, Dunbar, 
& Russell, 2011). The study consisted of a sample of 214 employed individuals of which 
55% were in a management/supervisor status, of which (n = 96) stated they had engaged 
in deception in the workplace (Lindsey et al., 2011). Remarkably, “no lies were 
uncovered through the interpretation of nonverbal cues, rather they were discovered after 
the fact through evidence or confessions” (Lindsey et al., 2011, p. 74). This effect of 
after-the-fact evidence and complete disregard for nonverbal variables coupled with the 
workplace power dynamic lends great weight to attempting a replication of the study 
within the highly charged culture of the military, where both power and stakes are greatly 
increased. 
Further support of investigating the qualitative rationale for veracity judgment is 
provided by Park et al., who argue in How People Really Detect Lies (2002) that the 
majority of previous studies relied too heavily on the nonverbal cues of interviewees in 
addition to factors such as: 
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(1) Sources and judges in deception detection experiments were most often 
unacquainted and that detection accuracy might be higher if judges had 
relational or idiosyncratic knowledge of the message source. 
(2) Participants had only rarely been allowed to interact face-to-face. 
(3) Lies are often sanctioned (encouraged to a degree) by the researcher. This 
argument holds that liars telling sanctioned lies should be less aroused 
than those telling unsanctioned ones. Consequently, unsanctioned lies 
should be more easily detected than sanctioned lies, and detection 
accuracy might be better if more researchers studied unsanctioned lies. 
(4) Predominance of testing under conditions of everyday versus high-stakes 
lies. 
Awareness of these limiting assumptions must be noted when conducting 
deception research. The risk associated with the factors listed can be mitigated through 
the use of content- and context-based questioning regimens. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Utilizing the Park et al. (2002) method, what types of information do U.S. 
military officers report using when detecting lies in in the workplace? If the study holds 
true to the original as set forth by Park et al. (2002), the authors expect to find that the 
vast majority of individuals report using subjective historical information or after-the-fact 
data rather than nonverbal cues to detect deception. The following chapter discusses the 
methodology used for Study 2. 
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VII. STUDY 2: METHODOLOGY 
Replication of Park et al.’s (2002) study occurred in an appropriately clinical 
manner, beginning with the authors’ approval of the NPS Institutional Review Board for 
the Protection of Human Subjects (IRB). The authors completed the mandated IRB 
ethically based training and all additional reviews, and subsequently received approval to 
initiate research. All research occurred on campus in specially designated rooms designed 
to best replicate the atmosphere of the initial study. Daily findings and survey materials 
were maintained under secure conditions, and no leakage of personally identifiable 
information (PII) or demographics occurred. Upon completion of the study, the 
questionnaires were divided, and all qualitative information was independently coded by 
two coders. 
A. PARTICIPANTS 
Participation in Study 2 was fully voluntary and comprised the identical sample 
used in Study 1, international military officers (n=41) serving as students at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. Tables 1, 2 and 3 and Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 discussed in Chapter III 
for Study 1 provide the full details and breakdown of the participants’ demographics. 
B. PROCEDURE 
After completing the truth-lie judgments in Study 1, respondents were asked a 
series of open-ended questions following Park et al.’s (2002) protocol (see Appendix. 
Consent Form and Questionnaire). Specifically, participants were told to recall a recent 
work-related situation in which they discovered that someone lied to them, and they were 
asked to remember as much as they could about what happened. 
Participants were asked to write a detailed description of the event: 
(1) Recall as much as you can about the situation in which the person 
originally lied to you. In as much detail as possible, describe the event 
where you were lied to: Where did it happen? What was the lie about? If 
you can, be sure to write down the exact thing that the person said to you. 
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Next, respondents were asked a series of questions related to some of the details 
surrounding the situation: 
(2) How long ago did this event (the lie) originally take place? 
(3) What was/is the relationship between you and the person who lied to you? 
(4) Now, think about how you found out that the person lied to you. Describe 
in as much detail as you can the events surrounding your discovery of the 
lie: How exactly did you find out that the person lied to you? 
2. Coding of Qualitative Data 
All questionnaires were collected from participants upon conclusion of their 
session and independently coded by two coders. The coding scheme was created by the 
authors based on N = 41 data collected from willing international military officers 
serving in resident student capacity at the Naval Postgraduate School. Participation was 
fully voluntary and anonymous and comprised the identical sample used in Study 1. 
Upon coding completion, the inter-coder reliability (Kappa) was calculated and any 
discrepancies were resolved via discussion between coders and the primary thesis 
advisor. This data are further reported in the results section. The qualitative codebook 
comprises the following questions and their associated Kappa. The question addressing 
“how long ago the lie was originally told” was coded using months as the unit of measure 
with a resulting Kappa of .99. The question of linking “relationship” included none 
specified, superior/immediate boss, superior/above immediate boss, subordinate, child, 
spouse, immediate family member (brother, sister, mom, dad), peer/friend, 
teacher/caregiver, senior in rank (but no command relationship), and other. Relationship 
coding resulted in a Kappa of .91. The “discover method” coding options included none 
listed, third party information, physical information, solicited direct confession, 
unsolicited direct confession, at-the-time verbal and/or nonverbal behavior, 
inconsistencies with prior knowledge, combination of two or more, and other. The 
“discovery method” Kappa was .84. The question addressing the lapse of time between 
when the lie was told and when the subject discovered the lie was coded as no answer 
provided, immediate detection, less than one hour, less than one day, less than one week, 
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less than one month, less than one year, and more than one year. The Kappa for time 
lapse was .72. The second coder transcribed the listing of discovery method examples as 
presented in Chapter IX. The following chapter will discuss the results of Study 2. 
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VIII. STUDY 2 RESULTS 
Study 2 respondents were asked to recall a work-related situation in which an 
individual lied to the participant; data was not collected or analyzed for 21 (51.2%) 
respondents who choose to recuse themselves of the question. Additionally, one 
respondent noted deception by his/her child and one respondent noted the deception as a 
teacher/student relationship. As the current study is interested in workplace-related 
deception, this interfamilial and teacher/student deception was eliminated from further 
analysis. Therefore, the sample for the relational research question is N=41 while the rest 
are N=39 to compensate for the removal of the non-workplace deception respondents. 
For those who chose to answer, 18 (46.2%) of the initial sample, the most 
common discovery methods were Third Party Information (15.4%) and Physical 
Information (12.8%). The least common valid discovery methods were unsolicited direct 
confession (2.6%) and inconsistencies with prior knowledge (2.6%). Table 10 delineates 
these findings while Table 11 presents examples of the discovery methods. 
 
Table 10.   Frequency of Recalled Workplace Lie Discovery Methods, Study 2 
 
DISCOVERY METHOD ƒ %
None Listed 21 53.8%
Third Party Information 6 15.4%
Physical Information 5 12.8%
Unsolicited Direct Confession 1 2.6%
Verbal/Nonverbal Behavior 3 7.7%





Table 11.   Examples of Discovery Method Categories 
The second portion of the questionnaire regarded the amount of time, in months, 
that had passed since the respondent had been told the lie. The range provided was 0–180 
months with the mean being 13.8735 and a standard deviation of 37.19455 as shown in 
Table 12. 
 









One sailor failed to show up for work because he said 
his mother was sick. After expressing verbally that I 
would help him get his mother help on several 
occasions, he finally told me that his mother was not 
sick and was late to work because he had not awakended 
after a long party. 
They kept looking the other way, being very unsettled 
during the questioning.
I told a colleauge about my trip to San Diego. He told 
me he had went to San Diego two weeks before and 
went to Sea World. Two weeks later he asked me how 
long of a drive it  was from San Diego? So I asked him 
how he traveled to San Diego, in which he said that he 
had not been to San Diego before. 
A subordinate didn't  come back from leave on time 
because he said he broke his hand. I checked his 
facebook page, talked to his friends, and spoke with his 
friends doctor which proved . 
Response Example
A colleauge lied about getting married to a local woman 
while on an operation in the Balkans. His new spouse 
told me, in confidence, that they were married. 
Going further into the investigation, the scanner in 
question was found at the indivduals residence. 
N MINIMUM MAXIMUM MEAN STD. DEVIATION
How Long Ago 39 0 180 13.8735 37.19455
Valid N 39
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Analysis was then conducted on the relationship of the participant and the liar as 
displayed in Table 13. Respondent disclosure analysis shows the primary relationship 
occurred between participants and subordinates (19.5%) with the least reported 
relationship between participants and superiors/immediate bosses (2.4%). 
 
 
Table 13.   Frequencies of Participant and Liar Relationship 
The final question related to the relationship between the respondent being told 
the lie and the subsequent realization and discovery of the lie that had been told. In 31 
(79.5%) of the cases, participants either did not answer the question or the answer 
provided was too vague for objective discernment. Of the lies told, six (15.4%) were the 
product of immediate truth judgments. Of note, the possibility of bias arises in the 
qualitative results as the participants were cued toward applicable near-term, work-
related lies. The remainder of the timing data can be found in Table 14. 
 
Table 14.   Frequencies of Lie Time Lapse 
RELATIONSHIP ƒ %
None Listed 21 51.2%





Senior (No Command Relationship) 1 2.4%
Other 1 2.4%
Total 41 100%
LIE TIME LAPSE ƒ %
No Answer Provided 31 79.5%
Immediate Detection 6 15.4%
< One Day 1 2.6%
< One Week 1 2.6%
Total 39 100%
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In the highly charged culture of the military, where lies carry significant 
consequences, it is expected there will be a high participant and subordinate discovery 
method response. Park et al. (2002) supports this with “…it can be argued that accuracy 
should be higher for high stakes lies because there should be more nonverbal leakage 
when the stakes are high” (p. 146). This is increased if consequences are shared by the 
respondent. Examinations of further distinguishing discovery methods are detailed in 
Chapter IX. 
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IX. STUDY 2: DISCUSSION, FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON ANALYSIS 
What is notable about this study’s findings is that international military officers’ 
third highest discovery method was verbal/nonverbal clues illustrated in Table 10. This 
coincides with the historically held idea that the deception detection basis is that of verbal 
and nonverbal cues, but contradicts Skidmore and Ortiz (2014) simultaneous research 
conducted on domestic officers. 
A. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS 
As hypothesized, this discovery method results closely resembled those of Park et 
al. (2002) and Lindsey et al. (2011): Third party and physical information were the most 
prevalent discovery methods in our work, as well as simultaneous research conducted by 
Skidmore and Ortiz (2014) on domestic officers. Tables 15 and 16 are provided for 
comparison. 
 
Table 15.   Frequencies of Recalled Lie Discovery Methods 
(after Park et al., 2002) 
Discovery Method ƒ %
None Listed - -
Third Party Information 62 32.0%
Physical Information 35 18.0%
Solicited Direct Confession 7 3.6%
Unsolicited Direct Confession 16 8.2%
Verbal/Nonverbal Behavior 4 2.1%
Inconsistencies with Knowledge 4 2.1%






Table 16.   Frequencies of Recalled Lie Discovery Methods 
(from Skidmore and Ortiz, 2014) 
B. LIMITATIONS 
Study 2 participant response rate was only 46.2% of the total sample of 
international military officers, preventing the authors from making robust inferences 
about deception detection in the workplace. Individuals exhibited difficulty in expressing 
deception detection in the workplace due to English as second language aptitude 
deficiencies. Furthermore, there were unaccounted cultural normalcies that inhibited the 
ability of an unknown number of international military officers to openly express 
workplace situations that involve deception detection. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON ANALYSIS 
Future Study 2 replication could be further improved by allowing participants the 
ability to describe deception detection in the workplace events utilizing their primary 
language. Nonetheless, the authors’ analysis concluded that third party and physical 
information were the primary methods for detecting deception as previous research 
indicates. Therefore, organizations and institutions should continue to seek out third party 
and physical information to develop content and contextual questioning of suspected 
individuals. The next chapter discusses the summary, conclusions, and areas for further 
research. 
Discovery Method ƒ %
None Listed 36 43.4%
Third Party Information 14 16.9%
Physical Information 12 14.5%
Solicited Direct Confession 2 2.4%
Unsolicited Direct Confession 4 4.8%
Verbal/Nonverbal Behavior 0 0.0%





X. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study successfully demonstrated Levine et al. (2014) replicability and 
strength of diagnostic utility usage over cue-based deception detection with a sample of 
diverse backgrounds of international military officers. Rendering that, future research can 
be focused and have widespread applicability. This study further illustrates the goal of 
improving consistency through both quantitative and qualitative reasoning is obtainable 
over historical methodologies and methods as Park et al. (2002) findings demonstrated. 
A. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this study was to replicate Levine et al. (2014) quantitative 
methodology and qualitative approach of Park et al. (2002) within a niche sample of 
international military officers at Naval Postgraduate School to gain insight into the 
transferability and gauge future modification and improvements to further content and 
contextual questioning approach to the greater body of knowledge of deception detection. 
For Study 1, quantitative analysis, strategically grouped questioning was employed, and 
deception detection accuracy was retrieved from participants’ observations of recorded 
interviews. For Study 2, qualitative analysis, the focus was on participants’ experiences 
with deception in the workplace, specifically asking descriptive information of where, 
what, why, when, and how individuals were able to recognize or identify deception. The 
unification and utilization of quantitative and qualitative approach for the enhancement of 
methodology within this study will garner a robust understanding of the applicability and 
inferences made possible by content and contextual questioning towards the deception 
detection body of knowledge. The depth and breadth enrichment of this research towards 
the greater body of knowledge of deception detection will be discussed in the sections to 
follow. 
The results of Study 1, a quantitative replication methodology of the Levine et 
al.’s (2014), demonstrated that diagnostic utility and judgment expertise are replicable 
with international military officers’ sample. The sample (N = 41) is somewhat small, 
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however, but it is highly represented of the demographic international officer population 
within Naval Postgraduate School. Given that the results produced increased accuracy in 
deception detection by the authors’ study regardless of a participant’s expertise level 
demonstrates the replicability and need to greater research content and contextual 
questioning methodology when it comes to deception detection. This is supported by the 
fact that non-expert participants’ accuracy increased to 63.8% and experts participants 
accuracy increased to 70.8% overall without discerning language and/or cultural 
exposure and/or proficiency versus replicable meta-data analysis mean of 54% (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006). Even though no concise breakaway within this sample is demonstrated 
and not a large enough sample was obtained to discern by region, nationality, language, 
or culture, it is highly conceivable that these characteristics play a role and need to be 
further researched. Nonetheless, with all the variability that exists, the authors are able to 
demonstrate the relevance and replicability without boundaries of the Levine et al.’s 
(2014) methodology in Study 1. 
The results of Study 2, a qualitative approach developed by Park et al. (2002), 
within the international military officers illustrated similar findings to that of Skidmore 
and Ortiz (2014) domestic officers. In that third party and physical information were the 
primary independent methods for detecting deception in the workplace, it is interesting to 
note that within our sample verbal and nonverbal cues was significant as a discovery 
method, keeping in line with historical body of knowledge of deception detection. 
Second, similarity within the samples was that deception was recognized within 
immediate or involved relationships in the workplace as identified by participants. The 
knowledge gained by Study 2 helps create a more robust understanding of workplace 
interaction and dynamics. The authors’ analysis of the sample data lends way to further 
incorporate organizational and morale ethos to garner smooth lines of communication by 
limiting deception noise by incorporating training and development of coalition and 




B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The authors encountered several limitations working with the current sample of 
international military officers at Naval Postgraduate School. The authors’ parallel study 
with Skidmore and Ortiz (2014) rendered some analysis limited or infeasible at this time 
due to numerous issues, one of the biggest for both studies being that of self-selection. 
The authors recommend additional studies of international military officers be undertaken 
so that data can be merged for further analysis to possibly identify regional, national, and 
ethnicity/race cultural norms that inhibit or bias individuals accuracy in deception 
detection. Furthermore, the videos utilized from Levine et al.’s (2014) methodology 
incorporates a trivia high-stakes game of northeastern university students, which renders 
its own challenges for nonwestern or un-immersed culturally participants. A highly 
accepted recommendation is that language proficiency or adaptation to native language 
be addressed to exemplify content and contextual questioning strategy in deception 
detection. Before going forth with developing custom or specific modifications to 
methodology, data should be gathered on diverse backgrounds of participants’ abilities to 
accurately detect deception with current tools to determine the strength of content and 
contextual questioning in lieu of bias and other barriers. Psycho-cultural effects are hard 
to gather or assess from the sample the authors obtained, which further hinders the ability 
to have a wide applicability or correlation analysis or inference to be conducted. Thus, 
being that, this data should be further expanded into a larger data pool for greater 
robustness. The authors’ ability nonetheless to replicate the diagnostic utility method of 
questioning on the sample in the parallel study from the population available is example 
of the fact that this body of knowledge can be tailored for specific stakeholders, 
especially business and national security, military, and intelligence communities. The 
authors are in agreement with Skidmore and Ortiz (2014) that obsolete methods of 
nonverbal variables and questioning techniques need to be reevaluated by various 
institutions and organizations like the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. 
(1) Accession, Recruitment, and Training 
Fraudulent enlistment/non-medically qualified attrition costs the DOD millions of 
dollars annually. According to usmilitary.com, referencing 2006 DOD recruitment 
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statistics, the average cost per recruit is nearly $50,000 through basic training across all 
services (About.com, 2006). A United States Government Accountability Office study 
from 1997, which is seemingly outdated but does provide relevant factual data, identified 
that in the fiscal year 1994, of the 176,400 newly accessed recruits, more than 7,000 were 
discharged within their first six months of service because they were found to be non-
medically qualified due to preexisting medical conditions that they concealed from 
recruiters and medical staff during processing (USGAO, 1997, p. 33). Furthermore, the 
research identified that more than 3,500 accessions were discharged within their first six 
months of service because they falsely represented or concealed their eligibility for 
military service (USGAO, 1998, p. 4). 
Applying 2006 recruitment costs to those discharged in fiscal year 1994 shows 
that the DOD spent approximately 525 million dollars on avoidable fixed and variable 
costs. Training service recruiters, military entrance processing station staff members, and 
medical screening teams in the content and contextual questioning methods when 
interviewing new accessions could greatly reduce the number of fraudulent enlistments 
and non-medically qualified attrites; also, it could potentially have significant savings for 
the DOD’s manpower budget. Follow on to training and development is the possible need 
to reevaluate current methods, through a needs assessment, in order to identify gaps 
within the intelligence community, within the militaries of various nations on the 
applicability and utility to bridge the gaps of interrogations. More importantly, it will 
create a more effective and robust gathering, analysis, and application of data and 
information to gain strategic advantage over an adversary utilizing content and contextual 
questioning over the historic nonverbal or heuristic approaches. Looking back at the last 
decade of conflict with a non-state actor enemy and further identified deficiencies of 
interrogations, especially those of enhanced or alternative means, have proven not to be 
reliable; rather, detrimental to states that practice techniques that are outside the accepted 
global universal norms. The authors believe that with further research, various national 
and military organizations can adopt techniques that would increase their abilities to 
identify deception through new adopted core competency with diagnostic utility 
questioning methods. 
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(2) Senior Officer Accession & Executive Training & Development 
The authors identify a further advantage from content and contextual questioning: 
For senior leadership training and development, even more emphasis on possible 
enhancement in the screening of commanding officers and strategically appointed 
positions of executive leadership. The authors note the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
advanced executive degrees, programs, and enrichment seminars can be greatly enhanced 
with the incorporation of identifying deception and diagnostic utility for the development 
and enrichment of risk assessment and decision making at the Center for Homeland 
Defense & Security (CHDS) and Center for Executive Excellence (CEE). Executive 
seminars like Navy Strategic Communication Workshop (SCW) and Strategic Planning 
for Execution: Assessment & Risk (SPEAR) offered by the CEE through the authors’ 
researched work of diagnostic utility can further advance the courses ability to develop 
senior leadership to gain a greater tool chest of resources and knowledge to make 
informed and decisive decision making in everyday situations, especially accessions into 
and in strategic posts. 
(3) Fraud Detection in International Contexts 
The authors’ Study 2, along with the Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud 
and Abuse by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), identified that third 
party or tips, as the ACFE notes them to be, are the most common way of detected 
deception. The ACFE 2014 study demonstrated that 5% of revenues or budgets are lost to 
fraud within the 1,483 international cases analyzed. If we take the yearly budget, this 
amount is roughly a $150 billion cost to the U.S. each year. This is a significant cost that 
needs to curtail especially since those are savings that the U.S. can pass on to taxpayers 
or reinvest into numerous other programs. Content and Contextual questioning as 
identified by the authors’ replication of Levine et al’s (2014) study can be vital and a low 
cost method of identifying and assisting in international fraud, which can greatly affect 




The authors’ thesis demonstrates the replicability of Levine et al.’s (2014) 
methodology of content and contextual questioning being nondependent to an expertise 
method of recognizing veracity within the deception detection field, along with a 
qualitative approach which furthers the resilience of diagnostic utility methodology 
through understanding the workplace setting experienced by international military 
officers. The incorporation and further research as described by the authors would build a 
competitive strategic advantage for any stakeholder that can foster this diagnostic utility 
core competency over lackluster historic methods. The advent of content and contextual 
questioning within the international military and civilian communities and institutions 
furthers heuristic and holistic approaches in detecting deception to curb various 
inefficiencies that are caused within states and organizations. Complexities of an 
expanding global arena of communication and interaction, along with coalition building 
to combat ever dynamic insurgents worldwide, depends on the ability of belligerents to 
be ever adoptive and resilient. Thus, this thesis offers insight to furthering the ability of 
entities to better prepare, analyze, and detect deception through a demonstrated 
replication of a method that is not dependent on expertise and burdensome costs. 
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APPENDIX. CONSENT FORM AND QUESTIONNAIRE 
Consent Form 
You are invited to participate in a research study to measure your perceptions about 
others’ communication. The purpose of the research is to better understand how people’s 
perceptions of communication impact their judgments. Your participation should take 
about 30 minutes to complete. 
You will be asked to watch short video clips, make judgments about each clip, and 
complete a survey about past experiences you have had with similar communication 
situations. 
Your participation is voluntary. If you participate, you are free to skip any questions or 
stop participating at anytime without penalty. The alternative to participating in the 
research is to not participate. 
Your responses are anonymous and will not be linked to your identity in any way. No 
personally-identifying information will be collected—the survey only asks for broad 
demographic information and no other identifiers from participants. 
The anticipated benefit from this study is that the findings will contribute to a larger body 
of knowledge, and they will be used to inform coursework at NPS. You will not directly 
benefit from your participation in this research. 
There are no known or anticipated risks associated with participation. 
Results of the survey will be used responsibly and protected against release to 
unauthorized persons; however, there is a minor risk that data collected could be 
mismanaged. Only the researchers will have access to the data which will be stored on a 
password-protected computer. 
If you have questions regarding the research, or if you experience any injury or 
discomfort, contact Dr. Lisa Lindsey, LLindsey@nps.edu, Principal-Investigator. If you 
have any questions regarding your rights as a research subject, please contact the Naval 
Postgraduate School IRB Chair, Dr. Larry Shattuck, 831.656.2473, lgshattu@nps.edu. 
Statement of Consent. I have read the information provided above. I have been given 
the opportunity to ask questions and all the questions have been answered to my 
satisfaction. I agree to participate in this study. I understand that by agreeing to 
participate in this research and checking the box below, I do not waive any of my legal 
rights. 
☐ I consent to participate in the research study. 
☐ I do not consent to participate in the research study. 
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You will see three sets of videotaped interviews. The basic situation is always the same, 
but the interviewer, the person interviewed, and the questions are different.  
 
Background: These clips are of interviews with college students who participated in a 
study about teamwork. Each subject had just played a trivia game with a partner for a 
cash prize. All participants were given an opportunity to cheat when the experimenter 
was called out of the room, and the answers were left in a folder within easy reach of the 
participants. Some participants cheated and others did not. All the people being 
interviewed on these tapes denied cheating. 
 
Instructions: Watch each interview and decided if you think they cheated or not. For 
each interview, circle an answer indicating your opinion about whether you think that 
they were honest and did not cheat or that they really did cheat and are lying about not 
cheating. 
 
Set 1  Video: Exline1_4clips (6 min.) 
Number  Interview Judgment (circle one) 
1  39  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
2  45  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
3  44  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
4  54  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
Set 2  Video: Exline2_4clips (11 min) 
Number  Interview Judgment (circle one) 
5  54  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
6  57  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
7  71  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
8  72  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
Set 3  Video: Exline4_4clips (12 min) 
Number  Interview Judgment (circle one) 
9  25  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
10  18  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
11  10  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
12  12  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
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Finally, we’d like for you to recall a recent work-related situation in which you 
discovered that someone lied to you. Please take a moment to think of an example and 
remember as much as you can about what happened. Keeping this situation in mind, 
please answer the following questions: 
 
1. Recall as much as you can about the situation in which the person originally lied 
to you. In as much detail as possible, describe the event where you were lied to: 
Where did it happen? What was the lie about? If you can, be sure to write down 




































4. Now, think about how you found out that the person lied to you. Describe in as 
much detail as you can the events surrounding your discovery of the lie: How 





















Please tell us about yourself (circle the correct answer or fill in the blank):    
Sex:  Male    Female      Age: ________ Years of Military Service: _______   
Rank: ____________ Branch (circle one):  Army Navy   Air Force Marines 
Have you ever received formal interviewing or interrogation training?  No    Yes 
Have you ever conducted interviewing or interrogation as a regular part of your job?  No    
Yes 







Alaskan or Hawaiian Native 
Other (please specify) ______________________________ 
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